On the morning of 28 September 2023, a recreational diver carrying out a decompression stop died when he was struck by the rotating propeller of the UK registered dive workboat Karin. The diver had been diving from a second dive workboat, Jean Elaine, that was also supporting divers exploring the wreck of the German battleship SMS Markgraf in Scapa Flow, Orkney, Scotland.

Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents, Andrew Moll OBE, said:

“Our findings highlight that all stakeholders, including operators, regulators, and industry bodies, must always prioritise the safety of those who are on the water, be that for work or pleasure.

“The basic principles of good watchkeeping: vigilance, clear communication and adherence to operational procedures for the activities undertaken are well tried and tested. Had they been followed during this event, particularly with two vessels operating in close proximity to submerged divers, this tragic accident could have been avoided.

“As highlighted in both our previous safety bulletin and in the final report, DSMBs play a crucial part in diver safety by enhancing a diver’s visibility and indicating their presence to surface craft. However, divers must ensure that they can quickly release the DMSB should it become snagged or the line jammed and not attach it to their person at any time.”

On the morning of 28 September 2023, Paul Smith, a submerged recreational diver carrying out a decompression stop, died when he was struck by the rotating propeller of the UK registered dive workboat Karin. The diver was diving from a second dive workboat, Jean Elaine, and had been exploring the wreck of the German battleship SMS Markgraf in Scapa Flow, Orkney, Scotland.

The diver and his buddy were carrying out a drift decompression ascent. The pair had released a delayed surface marker buoy while submerged to alert support craft of their presence, the line of which was attached to the casualty’s buoyancy control device.

Although the delayed surface marker buoy was visible to the second dive boat waiting on the other side of the wreck, it was not seen by Karin’s crew, and the vessel motored over its position. One of the two divers subsequently failed to resurface.

Immediate search and rescue efforts were unsuccessful in trying to locate the missing diver, and his body was located on the seabed during a specialist search 3 weeks later. The diver’s body, which showed signs of severe head injuries, was subsequently recovered one week later on 16 October.

The Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB) report states:

It is evident that the lookout arrangements on board Karin were ineffective, placing divers at risk of collision with the vessel while they were submerged close to the surface.

This tragic accident occurred in the last stages of a dive operation and involved the interaction of near-surface divers and support vessels manoeuvring in close proximity. The adoption of safety procedures supported by well-prepared risk assessments and emergency plans would enhance the safety of divers while travelling on board the vessel and when in the water.

Orkney Harbour Authority came into criticism over its co-ordination of dives on this popular site:

It is evident that control of the dive area was ineffective, placing divers at risk due to multiple vessels operating over a single wreck site.

Karin was cleared to proceed by Orkney VTS despite not having a valid permit in place, which contravened the harbour authority’s requirements. It is evident that the diving permit system was not being enforced effectively at the harbour authority level on the day of the accident.

The local safety committee established to oversee diving operations had been disbanded in 2020. Although the harbour authority had means to address general stakeholder issues, the more specific safety challenges relating to diving were probably better dealt with at the operator level.

The disbandment of the local safety committee removed the means of cohesive group communication for local dive workboat operators and meant there was no forum in which to highlight and mitigate associated risks and share good practice.

The full report from MAIB can be downloaded here: